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REMARKS OF PROFESSOR ENGEL
Mr. Piper has given an excellent presentation of the pros and cons of
defining aggression; the difficulty of arriving at a satisfactory definition
as well as the disparate results to which different definitions might lead
was illustrated well by the Arab-Israeli case. In many cases it is difficult
to determine a cause-and-effect relationship, that is, to identify the
aggressor and victim; the party that acted and the one that reacted. One
must sometimes refer back over a very long time to make these determi-
nations. In the Arab-Israeli case one might look back to the time of
Abraham, the patriarch of the Jews, and of Ishmael, considered to be
the ancestor of the Arabs. Abraham could be said to have committed a
bloody act of aggression against Ishmael when he circumcised him at
the age of thirteen. Although Abraham could have pleaded "superior
orders," having acted upon the commandment of the Lord, history
demonstrates that there has been hardly a case when the aggressor did
not invoke the help of the Lord or claim the Lord to be on his side.
Under these circumstances I wonder if there is much point in attempting
to define aggression, when the complexity of the series of events in many
situations effectively precludes a meaningful determination of who
started the action.
In connection with Mr. Rusk's paper, the title of the General Assem-
bly Resolution reminds me of the famous, or infamous, resolution
adopted by the League of Nations in 1936 concerning the "Application
of the Principles of the Covenant," which really meant the nonapplica-
tion of those principles. I hope the similarity in title is no omen.
Whereas Mr. Rusk has referred to the legal status of the General
Assembly resolution, I wish to consider the resolution in a more general
framework, namely, in the context of modification and interpretation
of the Charter through the subsequent practice of United Nations or-
gans. A convention on the law of treaties' was recently adopted in
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Vienna at a conference convened under the auspices of the United Na-
tions. That convention includes in article 31 a provision concerning the
interpretation of the treaty through the subsequent practice of the par-
ties to the convention. Article 3 1, however, does not consider the subse-
quent practice of the organs of an international organization as an
interpretation of the instrument under which they operate. In the
Expenses case' Sir Percy Spender argued against treating the practice
of international organs as similar to the practice of the parties to a
treaty, and I believe there are sound reasons why article 31 of the Vienna
Convention should not be applied by analogy to international organs.
Even a unanimous General Assembly resolution creates no new law but
is at best a factor in the creation of customary law by the United
Nations members who voted in support of the resolution. Contrary to
what Mr. Rusk seems to suggest, I doubt that the General Assembly
has the power to give the Charter an authentic interpretation, even by
unanimous resolution. Interpreting a legal text authoritatively is com-
mensurate with creating or amending it, and would therefore necessitate
compliance with requirements of the Charter for its creation or formal
amendment: ejus est interprelari cujus est condere (it is his to interpret
whose it is to enact). The absence of an organ with the power of authen-
tic interpretation contributes to the possibility of conflicting interpreta-
tions by different organs. And since there is no organ to decide which
interpretation is "right" and which is not, all interpretations perforce
must be "right." This dilemma reminds me of the story of a rabbi who
was one time approached by a young couple to hear their separate
complaints. Upon hearing the husband's account of the problem, he
said, "You are right, my son." And after the wife had finished her story,
he responded, "You are right, my daughter." When his wife questioned
how both could be right, the wise rabbi answered, "You are right, too,
my dear wife."
REMARKS OF PROFESSOR TAULBEE
In the 18th and 19th century aggression meant a military attack by
the forces of one state against the territory or vessels of another, and
often the terms "unjust" or "unprovoked" aggression were neutral
terms relating to military activities. Aggression acquired a pejorative
meaning after World War I when in discussions among the Allies it
came to mean an unlawful resort to force. Aggression and self-defense
thus became complements. As Brownlie has noted, however, the com-
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plementary relationship was a basic assumption, not a definition of
either term. The term "aggression" has now passed into common use,
and frequent attempts at its definition have been made: for example, (1)
the Pacts of 1933 between the U.S.S.R. and its neighbors,3 (2) the
provisions of the Nuremburg Charter which involve moral, not legal
strictures, (3) the International Law Commission reports, and (4) the
work of the Special Committees of the United Nations General Assem-
bly in 1953, 1956, and 1959.
Despite the several attempts at defining aggression, there have been
few satisfactory results. Some of the unresolved questions that obstruct
progress towards a good definition are whether the word "aggression"
denotes a fact or a legal judgment; is it the consequence of behavior, or
is it perhaps inclusive of intentions underlying behavior? There have
been discussions of military, diplomatic, ideological, economic, and pro-
pagandistic aggression, and among these there is a dichotomy between
those acts of aggression that should be dealt with under article 51 of the
United Nations Charter and other acts that should only be condemned.
The scope of the definitional problem might perhaps be contained within
the single question: What are the legally permissible forms of a state's
involvement in the internal or external affairs of another state? Nations
have approached the question in different ways. The smaller nations in
the Sixth Committee debates, for example, advocated that a state be
prohibited from any form of pressure or threat of intervention in the
affairs of other states. By contrast, United States statesmen during the
last twenty years have consistently interpreted the legal prohibitions
against force to reinforce political requirements of the containment
policies of the United States. In this endeavor, the ambiguity of the
concepts of "aggression" and "armed attack" have been invaluable.
Four successive administrations have asserted that at least certain forms
of "indirect" aggression might be assimilated into the concept of
"armed attack" in order to justify the use of force as a measure of
unilateral or collective self-defense. Not unexpectedly, the nature of the
circumstances in which indirect aggression may justify a state in resort-
ing to the use of force in self-defense has remained largely undefined.
Should there be any attempt at all to define aggression? In debate of
this question there are on the one side Julius Stone and G.G. Fitzmaur-
ice who argue that a definition would be "a trap for the innocent and a
signpost for the guilty"; on the other side are John Hazard and Ian
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Brownlie who argue that the failure to reach a precise definition merely
indicates that the problem is difficult, not that the concept cannot be
defined.
I am inclined to reject both positions as extreme and to note further
that the possible solution is not a compromise between them. Several
objections might be raised against both views. For example, the Stone-
Fitzmaurice argument against "aggression" as a norm can be made
against most legal rules since, at least to the extent they are known and
well defined, they are subject to manipulation by interested and unscru-
pulous individuals. The potential for manipulation is present particu-
larly in legal orders where authoritative third-party review is nonexis-
tent. The thrust of the Stone argument, then, is to deny that law has
any value qua law as normally understood. This fallacy of the argument
may result largely from Stone's tendency to view the international legal
order in both unimodal and unifunctional terms. Stone is thus hoisted
by his own bootstrap when he suggests that rather than try to define
aggression, which is a pejorative, politically charged, and ambiguous
term, we should look for some more neutral term like "breach of the
peace." Given the nature of the contemporary international system, any
term which purports to serve as a surrogate for "aggression" will surely
suffer the same fate of ambiguity and political controversy. To argue
otherwise would ignore historical experience.
The arguments of Brownlie and Hazard are no more cogent than
those of Stone and Fitzmaurice. It is as true as it is irrelevant to the
problem that there is logically no real difficulty in defining "aggres-
sion." I could easily draft a definition on request. Would you choose a
stipulative-enumerative or open-ended mode, or perhaps a mixture of
the two? Although a broad, inclusive definition might be desirable in
many ways, it likely would not satisfy the practitioner's preference for
a concise text. On the other hand, the usefulness of a narrower definition
is questionable in the absence of authoritative third-party interpretation
and review. And the terms of a concise statement of law inevitably
require further definition. It is at this point that Stone's critique be-
comes instructive. Definition is clearly more than a purely technical
question.
The political obstacles to definition are obvious, but perhaps we
should note the success of the Special Committee considering the Princi-
ples of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Coopera-
tion among States. A most important development was the rejection of
the common law perspective by more than ninety United Nations mem-
ber states. A substantial number of United Nations members viewed the
Special Declaration as more than a restatement and reaffirmation of
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Charter norms and more than a reassessment of fundamental assump-
tions of international law. They considered the Declaration an attempt
to specify new relationships between old assumptions. The work of the
Special Committee was in this respect an exercise in codification.
The real question, however, is the impact that such exercises have
upon the behavior of states. Quite apart from the technical question of
the legislative competence of the General Assembly is the paradoxical
behavior demonstrated by some states with respect to the Special Decla-
ration. In the period since the Declaration's germination in 1954, several
of the states that pushed hardest for a statement of principle have en-
gaged in actions clearly violative of both the letter and spirit of the
Declaration. The United Arab Republic is an example. From the tradi-
tional perspective of law and the functions of law, state support for a
statement of general principles appears blatantly hypocritical.
A more fruitful interpretation of exercises like the Special Declara-
tion might be that general statements of principle are insufficient to
provide normative guidance to states in concrete situations. Guidance,
in this sense of the word, is actually a function of the consensual rules
that arise out of the everyday interaction of states. General principles,
or as Richard Lillich calls them, "black-letter law," are, to use Nicholas
Onufs' terminology, normative-symbolic rather than normative-
coercive.
Two separate concepts are involved in this observation: the multifunc-
tional nature of law and the multilevel nature of the international legal
order. Both concepts, if not totally ignored, are at least widely disputed
by those who see law from a more traditional viewpoint. It is my belief
that traditional unifocal assumptions have had a detrimental effect on
research and consequently on the development of knowledge concerning
the nature of the international legal order and its relationship to the
contemporary international system.
A recognition of diversity, however, is merely a recognition of the
complexity of the international legal order. Distinctions are suggested
by geographical and ideological differences, various processes of rule
formation and application, heterogeneity of situations to be regulated,
and the rapid change in recent years to which law must adapt. As
Michael Barkun has pointed out, however, not every legal order per-
forms every function of law.
In terms of the concepts to which I have alluded, the Special Declara-
tion, the United Nations Charter, and a definition of aggression would
be considered principles of the first order, but would be relegated to
serving symbolic or communicative functions. Policy-makers might cite
those principles as "black-letter law" in order to justify state actions,
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but second-order considerations derived from state practice and specific
context will have the greater effect on final decisions. In this respect we
might consider a third order of legality as suggested by Karl Deutsch's
formulation: If in some contexts there is no law for behavior, then there
should be recognized a law of behavior.
The foregoing considerations taken together suggest that it really
makes no difference, in a formal sense, whether or not "aggression" is
defined. A definition would serve only as an additional rhetorical
weapon in the armory of national self-justification. But the real value
of attempting to define aggression may not lie in a final product. The
subtler value for long-term consideration may be, as John Hazard has
noted, in the interaction among those of different ideological and legal
backgrounds who work to formulate a definition. Thus, the payoff
might not come from a successful definition, but from the definitional
process itself. And small steps are better than none.
At this point it should be considered that however persuasive my
argument might be in analytic terms, it nevertheless raises problems in
a practical sense. Its unconventionality probably means that it is either
unknown or irrelevant to policy-makers. And even assuming that my
arguments are good ones, their credibility among practitioners necessar-
ily will be limited. The confusion alluded to earlier will as a consequence
be perpetuated.
My comments have emphasized the functions of the law and their
relationships with various orders of legality. But beyond this remains a
fundamental problem with respect to the content of the law. The diffi-
culty is that the content of international law might be so trivial that even
though the function is adequate!y performed, no significant progress will
be made. The hope is that, by a redefinition and expansion of legal
functions, the content of international law will be made more meaning-
ful. Whether or not this hope will be realized is not at all obvious. But
the consideration now raised and the work of the scholars mentioned in
this presentation are at least the starting points and signposts. The
question of whether the road is worth taking remains to be answered.
DISCUSSION FROM THE Floor
LT. NEWTON:
Paragraph six of the Declaration on Friendly Relations indicates that
a nation may not use force in retaliation to an initial act which threatens
neither the territorial nor the political integrity of the injured nation. I
would like Professor Rusk to comment on whether this paragraph or
international law in general prohibits the use of force in retaliation by
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a nation against another which sinks a vessel of the former nation, but
which obviously does not have the capability to threaten either the
territorial or the political integrity of the injured nation?
MR. RUSK:
First, let me narrow my response by excluding a discussion of the
problem of enforcing a general right to use certain areas of the ocean.
In response to the situation that Lt. Newton poses, it would be most
beneficial as a matter of policy for the world community to refrain from
using force; the solution sought by violence might be reached by use of
other nonviolent channels. This restraint militates against the growth of
the scale of violence. The obvious example of the use of restraint oc-
curred in the Pueblo incident where two decisions were made: first, that
the matter of highest priority was to obtain the captives' release, which
would be possible only by use of the diplomatic instrument; and second,
that it was desirable to avoid increasing the possibility of a major mili-
tary conflict in the area of Korea. Thus it was determined that military
action would not be taken until other channels had been explored to the
fullest extent.
This position of full exploration of non-military recourses is not an
unusual approach in a post-war period when attempts are made to
minimize the level of violence used in response to a situation. When
guerrillas entered Greece from Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, the
West did not open up hostilities against the three countries although,
as a matter of collective self-defense, force might have been a justifiable
alternative. And, when Mr. Stalin blockaded West Berlin the United
States did not use force to reopen the city, but resorted instead to an
air lift in order to gain time to reason with the opposition. Moreover,
President Truman did not open a general war with China when the
Chinese entered Korea; the United States attempted to prevent the
situation in Southeast Asia from reaching the point of hostilities. Even
though traditional international law might extend the right to use con-
siderably more force than is actually employed, diplomatic channels are
coming to be used in many situations to reduce the scale of violence.
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